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As we approach the WTO Ministerial meeting in Qatar during November 9 to 13
later in the year, there still remain major differences among the Contracting Parties on the
agenda of a possible new Round to be launched at Qatar. But, while differences over
questions such as the inclusion on the agenda of competition (along with anti-dumping
reform) and investment policies, and certain environmental questions, are certainly
negotiable, and may be expected to be resolved, this is not the case for labour standards.
Major developing countries will not compromise on this issue. In fact, after
President Clinton’s fatal gaffe during the Seattle talks over endorsing trade sanctions to
enforce such standards, the position of the developing countries has hardened
considerably: any involvement of the WTO, in any shape or form, on labour questions is
ruled out. At the same time, several Democrats in the US Congress, reflecting the politics
of union support, have hardened in the opposite direction. Senator Gephardt, the Minority
leader in the House, asserted in August that the renewal of fast-track, rechristened as
Trade Promotion Authority, is contingent on making labour rights “central to U.S. trade
agreements”.
The politics of this issue in Washington is clear enough: Democratic leadership
considers the rejection of linkage to be a morally defective affliction of Republicans and
“free trade ideologues”. This sounds so plausible to the untutored that few in the rich
countries understand the opposition of the poor countries to linkage, often dismissing it
self-servingly as reflective of governments indifferent to the interests of their workers.
But one must ask: why does even a totally democratic country like India, and all its
labour unions, regardless of their political orientation and with a membership at over 7
million, oppose such “linkage” of trade and labour? Are they wrong?
No. In fact, if the case for their opposition was presented fairly and without
political obfuscation by lobbies in the policy arena, it would be found compelling. It is
best seen by distinguishing sharply among, and refuting, two main arguments for linkage
that are invariably confused in the charged political debate.
One reflects “egoistical” or self-interest-driven motives reflecting fears that, in the
absence of linkage, the real wages and the labour standards of the workers in rich
countries will collapse. The other arises from “altruistic” concerns about the real wages
and labour standards elsewhere: linkage is seen as necessary to spread better standards
abroad. But neither contention is valid: the fears that one’s wages and standards are at
risk with freer trade are not compelling whereas linkage is an inefficient, even
counterproductive, way to advance labour standards worldwide.
Consider the “egoistical” reasons. Unions fear freer trade with the poor countries
for two main reasons. They dread that it will reduce the real wages of workers; they are
also certain that, as capital moves to poor countries with lower standards, they will lose
their hard-won labour standards.
The fear over real wages has had political salience since the 1980s when real
wages stagnated, possibly even declined, interrupting the postwar trend increase in
wages. It seems “obvious” then that competition through freer trade with the poor
countries must be creating poor in the rich countries by reducing the real wages of
unskilled workers. But probe deeper and the fear vanishes.
If it were justified, the mechanism would have to be the falling (relative) prices of
labour-intensive goods (such as textiles and shoes) in world trade. But through the 1980s,
these prices appear to have risen instead! The main  reason, of course, is that the general
presumption that over time more poor countries will become suppliers of such goods in
world trade and hence lower their prices is false. Poor countries also move on, getting
richer, and they withdraw from labour-intensive into skills and capital-intensive exports,
thus “absorbing” the new suppliers’ exports. As the Australian economist Ross Garnaut, a
former Ambassador to China, has shown, China’s dramatic rise in labour-intensive
exports in the 1980s was almost totally offset by the withdrawal of East Asian
economies; the latter, in turn, had entered these markets in the 1970s with a partial offset
from Japan’s shift away from them. Most trade economists have now concluded that
trade with poor countries is not the main driver of the pressure on rich-country wages; in
fact, it may well have moderated the fall that would ensue from technical change that
continually reduces the need for unskilled workers.
As for the “race to the bottom”, it has become a matter of faith that corporations
will force lower standards at home by threatening exit to poor countries with lower labour
standards otherwise. But, when one looks for evidence, there is little beyond occasional
anecdotes. David Drezner, a political scientist at Chicago University and the Council on
Foreign relations who has carefully examined the question, has concluded that the “race
to the bottom” rhetoric is little more than that. Indeed, even in the highly competitive
apparel industry, where many firms have gone abroad to the poor countries, sweatshops
have not broken out in the rich countries in response. The American sweatshops reflect
rather domestic factors such as reliance on illegal immigrants and the abysmal level of
internal enforcement.
The demand for linkage that reflects these unsupported concerns can then be
interpreted legitimately as “protectionist”. If competition gets rough, you can either
restrict imports through conventional import protection; or you can, anyway you can try
to raise the cost of production of your rivals and thereby reduce their competitiveness
through what might be called “export” protectionism. Linkage in order to raise standards
abroad, including growing demands for a “living wage”, is clearly that beast.
But the problem with the altruistic demand for linkage is not that it reflects
protectionism but that linkage in the form of a Social Clause at the WTO will not do the
job. By making market access conditional on satisfaction of labour standards, it creates
two problems: it makes the use of trade sanctions the way to advance standards; and it
makes the WTO the international institution charged with the job.
Complex problems such as child labour cannot be solved through trade sanctions.
They need heavy lifting: working with local NGOs, with supportive governments, with
parents, with schools. Trade sanctions can flag the issue; they cannot flog it. The ILO’s
Program for the Eradication of Child Labour does just what is necessary.
Also, when my friend Robert Reich claims, as do unions, that the WTO has teeth
(i.e. it imposes trade sanctions) but the ILO has none, I say: God gave us not just teeth
but also a tongue. And today, a good tongue-lashing based on credible documentation by
impartial and competent bodies such as a restructured ILO can unleash shame,
embarrassment, guilt to push societies towards greater progress on social and moral
agendas.
The WTO, in any event, is a cash-starved organization, with under $100 million
as its annual budget. Do the Quad powers that continue to deny it any added funds, and
concentrate cynically on Bretton Woods institutions (where they have weighted votes) for
their financial largesse, seriously expect that these complex social issues can be handled
by a secretariat that can barely and bravely manage conventional trade analysis? Do they
really mean to advance labour standards or are they simply surrendering to the demands
of their union constituencies, throwing a bone at them that is actually a bone down the
gullets of the poor countries?
The bottom line then is that, with freer trade and labour issues linked by neither
legitimate fears nor legitimate aspirations, it is simply wrong to insist that the WTO must
address labour issues in any form. Not for the first time, the leading rich countries have it
wrong.
